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David Wf. Sellers, for the assignee.-Where the estate of the
debtor is divested by operation of law dower is barred. 'The Act
of.1867 divests the estate as much as a sale for the payment of
debts. The exceptions in section 14 do not save the rights of
married women. The Act of 1841 did; and hence the ruling in
Worcester v. Clark,2 Grant 84, does not apply.
CAD WALADER, J.-The wife's right of dower having been
established by the Pennsylvania decisions against the assignee in
insolvency, there is no doubt that the purchaser's objection to the
title is valid.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

1

2

SUPREME COURT OF 11ISSOURI.SUPREM1E COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.

4
6

6

7

ABANDONED PROPERTY.

Seizure of.-Under the Act of Congress, approved March 12th 1863,
authorizing the secretary of the treasury to appoint agents to collect
abandoned property, the right to collect abandoned property does not
depend upon the "loyalty" or "disloyalty" of the owner. That becomes
a question only upon application to the government to restore the proceeds: Bart v. Reynolds, 1 Heiskell.
Property was not subject to seizure as abandoned, unless the owner
was engaged in rebellion, either in arms or otherwise, or gave aid and
comfort to those so engaged: Id.
Property left in the care of another person, under a colorable sale,
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by one publicly residing in an adjoining county, visiting the place
where the property was, and not in arms or encouraging the rebellion,
is not abandoned: Id.
A conveyance of property during the war, with intent to evade confiscation, was not an abandonment of the property sold, which would
authorize the seizure of it: Id.
A person seizing property as agent of the government, could not
justify under proof of probable cause to suspect that it was abandoned:
Id.
ACTION.

Parties Plaintiff-Assignee.-The assignee of an account must sue
in his own name as plaintiff as being the real party in interest, although
the statutes of 1865 have omitted the provision making accounts assignable: Long v. Eeinridh, 46 or 47 Mo.
ADVANCEMENT.

Presumptions in regard to.-Advancement is always a question of
intention, and where there is no evidence of what occurred at the time
of the alleged advancement, the attendant circumstances are to be considered in determining whether it be a loan, gift, or advancement:
Weaver's Appeal, 63 Penna.
Among the circumstances, the most important are, the amount as
compared with the parent's estate, the number of children, and the
purpose of the advance: Id.
It is always a presumption that a parent means to treat his children
equally: Id.
If his estate is large, a comparatively small sum will raise the presumption of a gift: Id.
If the purpose was education, it will be presumed until rebuttal to
have been in discharge of parental duty: Id.
A conveyance to a child either directly or by payment of the purchase-money, and having the deed made to the child, is primd facie an
advancement: Id.
Evidence-Declarations.-All declarations of intent made by an
ancestor during the execution of a settlement of property among a set
of his children are admissible in evidence, to aid in determining whether the purpose of the ancestor was to make an advancement or a gift:
Dulbig v. Johnson, 32 Ind.
A father of two sets of children, the first set consisting of three, in
directing the conveyance of certain lands to two of said first set, the
land so received by each being nearly equal in value to a tract which
the father had previously caused to be conveyed to the third child of
said first set, said, that he desired such conveyance to be made to said
two children because their mother had worked very hard and had not
lived to enjoy the property, and he therefore desired her children to
have a share over and above the other set of children by his second
wife. Held, in a suit for partition of other lands, owned by the father
at his death, that all said conveyances to the first set of children were
gifts: Id.
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AGENT.

A real estate broker finding a purchaser for the land of his principal
is entitled to his commissions, although the principal vary the terms of
the sale or sell part of the land at a higher price than that at which he
authorized the agent to sell: Woods et al. v. Stephens, 46 or 47 31o.
Declarationof Agent.-The declaration of an agent made, not in the
course of his agency, but after the transaction to which they relate, in
casual conversation with persons not parties to such transaction, are not
binding on his principal: Bennett v. Holmes, 32 Ind
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT.

Test of Liability.-H. bought property from K., and in payment
gave him a note at eighteen months payable to W. and by him endorsed.
On the same day, after the delivery of the note to K., be returned with
it to the clerk of H., said it was to have been drawn with interest, and
the clerk, with the assent of H., added "with interest." The note
being unpaid by the drawer at maturity, K. sued W. and gave in evidence the note with the addition taken out. Held, the alteration not
having been fraudulently made, that W. was liable notwithstanding the
alteration: Kountz v. Kennedy, 63 Penna.
Restoring the note to its original condition by erasing the alteration
was not a fraud on the endorser, for it left the note as it was when he
endorsed it. The material test as to liability on an altered instrument
is whether its identity remains: Id.
If the alteration of a note, &c., be made fraudulently or with an
illegal intent, or the original words cannot be certainly restored, or any
party has become interested in it or affected by it or related to it since
the alteration so that the alteration will do him wrong, the party making
the alteration must abide by it and its consequences; otherwise he may
restore the note to its original form and force : Id.
If when satisfaction of a note is demanded it be the same as before
without having been fraudulently tampered with, it is not to be regarded
as having been altered materially: Id.
There is no rule of law, independent of intention, by which an alteration not affecting ultimate liability makes the instrument void: Id.
ATTORNEY AT LAW.

Not an Offlcer-Oath.-The Act of 1868, c. 2, s. 5, requiring the
courts to administer the abjuration of the Ku-Klux to "all officers,"
did not apply to attorneys: Ingersoll v. .Howard, 1 Heiskell.
The courts had no power to require such oath by a general rule: Id.
Lien for Fees- On Property in Litigation.-Attorneys, solicitors
and counsel have a lien upon property recovered or protected by their
services, which may be declared by order in the cause in which the
services are rendered: Hunt v. Mc Clanahan,1 Heiskell.
The client cannot, while the suit is pending, so dispose of the subjectmatter in suit, as to deprive the attorney of his lien, nor afterwards, to
any purchaser, with notice : Id.
BROKER.
VOL. XIX.-13

See Agent.
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CHAMPERTY.

Assignment of a bid at chancery sale, after sale set aside and resale
made, is void for champerty: Newland v. Gaines, 1 Heiskell.
COMMON CARRIER.
States was.-In the late civil war, the troops
United
Public Enemy-

of the United States were a "public enemy," against whose act a common carrier within the Confederate lines did not insure: So. Express
Co. v. Womack, 1 Heiskell.

If a common carrier accepts goods to be carried for hire, the fact
that the freight was paid and accepted in an illegal currency, would
not affect his liability for the loss of the goods by negligence: Id.
Delivery of Goods to- Unsigned Receipt may be proved by ParolConnecting Lines-Liabilityfor Loss on any _art of the Line.-Where

flour was brought to Ogdensburg by the Northern Tranisportation Company, consigned to the plaintiffs at Concord, N. H., and to go over the
railroad of the Northern (N. Y.) Railroad Company, and was deposited
in a store-house under the general control of the Transportation Company,
and according to the course of business there forsix or seven years, a clerk
of that company forwarded to the plaintiffs a way-bill marked "duplicate," and headed "Northern Railroad Company," and dated "Ogdensburg Depot," but not signed by any one, but reciting that said company
had received of the Transportation Company the flour in question, and
promising to deliver it to the consignees subject to charges as specified;
and at the same time sent to the Northern Railroad Company a duplicate of such way-bill, which was entered by them in a book called the
"Receipt Book," or the "Lake Freight Ledger," and the Transportation Company also drew upon the consignees for the freight to Ogdensburg; after which sending of the way-bills, in the usual course of
business, orders and applications respecting the freight were addressed
by the consignees to the Railroad Company, and were acted upon and
answered by its agents, without any communication with the Transportation Company on the subject. And where also the plaintiffs' evidence
tended to prove that after the loss of the flour by fire they applied to
the defendants, then the trustees of said Railroad Company, to adjust
their loss, and received no notice that defendants had not received the
flour, or that any other party had possession of it at the time of the
fire, or was responsible for it, and that plaintiffs had no knowledge that
the defendants had not received the flour, or that they denied the
receipt of it, until after the suit was brought: It was held, that if
these way-bills were sent to the consignees with the knowledge of the
defendants and with the intention on their part that they should be
received and acted upon by the plaintiffs as the representations and
.undertakings of the defendants, and they were so received and acted
upon by the plaintiffs who were induced thereby to make this claim
and to bring this suit, the defendants would be estopped to deny that
they had so received the flour. It was also held, that upon this
evidence it was competent for the jury to find all the facts necessary
to constitute such estoppel. It was also decided that while the defendants held the flour, so received, at Ogdensburg, awaiting the means to
forward it, they held it as common carriers, and not as warehousemen,
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unless by some order or agreement of plaintiffs, they were authorized
to store it for them, and this would be so, even if plaintiffs had reason
to expect delay of some weeks at Ogdensburg by reason of the accumulation of freight there. It was also held, that the counting of the flour
when delivered by the Transportation Company to the railroad might
be waived by them, and that it was competent for the jury from the
circumstances stated to find that they had done so, and that the delivery
was complete: Barter& Co. v. Wheeler et al., 49 N. H.
Where goods are delivered to a transportation company to be transported over its route and over several railroads to the place of its destination, the companies having associated and formed a continuous line,
an intermediate company is liable for the loss of goods happening upon
its part of the line: .d.
Where several distinct corporations associate together and form a
continuous line of common carriers, each being empowered to contract
for freight and passengers for the whole line, and to receive pay for the
same, which is to be divided in prescribed proportions, they are jointly
liable for losses or injuries upon any part of the line : Id.
Where a contract is made in one state to transport goods over a line
extending through two or more states, and the goods are lost, the rights
of the parties will be governed by the laws of the state where the loss
happened: Id.
Where common carriers by water, in their bill of lading made at
Toledo, Ohio, stipulate to deliver goods to consignees at Concord, N. H.
the dangers of .navigation, fire, and collisions on the lakes and rivers
and the Welland Canal excepted, it was held, that this limitation did
not extend to losses by fire on the railroads: Id.
Where the trustees under a second mortgage of a railroad have taken
possession of it, and have afterwards by a bill in equity obtained a
decree of foreclosure with a provision for a sale of the railroad in
accordance with the power conferred by the mortgage, and have themselves become the purchasers as they were authorized to do by the
decree, and to hold the property in trust for the bondholders, and they
continued to keep possession of the railroad and operate it as such
trustees, it was held, that they were liable as common carriers for the
loss of goods received for transportation : Id.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.

Payment in, executed.-To bring a payment in Confederate currency,
made on a note, within the rule as to executed contracts, it is not necessary that the payment be of the entire sum due, nor that it be endorsed
as a credit on the note: Cross v. Sells, 1 Heiskell.
Sale for.-A party who has sold property for Confederate treasury
notes, cannot, upon a tender of the Confederate notes, refuse to accept
them and bring detinue or trover for the property: Williams v. Elkins,
1 Heiskell.
Whether he can recover for the value of the property, quere ? Id.
Consideration.-Confederate treasury notes possessed during the
existence of the "Confederate States," such elements of value as rendered the loan of them a valuable consideration, which would support
a contract: NAraff v. Crawford, 1 Heiskell. 4
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Not Illegal.-The judgment in Thorington v. Smith, 9 Wll. 1,
approved, holding that Confederate treasury notes were issued and
imposed on the community by irresistible force; that the use of them
by parties who had no illegal purpose in such use, was not unlawful:
SherfyJ v. Argenbright, 1 Heiskell.
Enemy Relatian.-Confederate treasury notes, as a consideration
passing from a person resident within the Confederate lines, to an attorney in fact of one resident in the loyal states, were not a valid and
legal consideration: Conley v. Burson, 1 Heiskell.
Such payment amounts to a mere deposit, to the use of the payer: Id.
A power of attorney from a person in a loyal state to one in the Confederate States to sell land in Tennessee, was revoked by the war, and
a sale being made under such power of attorney for Confederate treasury
notes, received by the agent, the loss by the failure in value of the
notes falls upon the buyer: Id.
Payment in, to Agent or Bailee.-A note placed in the hands of
another as a collateral security, or as agent for collection, being paid to
the holder in Confederate money, did not bind the payee or release the
debtor, where the payor knew the nature of the holder's right, or was
put upon inquiry as to it: Scruggs v. Luster, 1 Heiskell.
The bailee having received Confederate notes, will be required to
account to the payor for their value at the time they were received: Id.
Collateral Security.-Where a debtor transferred a note payable in
Confederate treasury notes, to be credited, if paid, otherwise he to
stand bound for the original debt; held that the contract was not
affected by the Confederate consideration of the note, and was not a
contract to pay in Confederate notes: Marshall v. Dodson, I Heiskell.
CONFEDERATE STATES.

See Carrier; Confederate Notes; Contract;

Duress; Evidence; InternationalLaw; Stamp; Tax Sale.
Seizure of Arms.-The seizure by a Confederate colonel within the
Confederate lines, of arms, which could be made available for purposes
of war, concealed, belonging to a Federal soldier, was justifiable under
the belligerent rights of the Confederate States: Cummings v. Diggs,
I Heiskell.
To exclude evidence of the official character of the defendant, who
justified as an officer, under the Confederate States, was error, and
parol evidence was admissible to prove that defendant was such officer:
Id.
Justification.-In an action of trespass, a plea, which attempts to
justify an act under the belligerent powers of the Confederate state, is
defective if it fails to show the defendant was a soldier. That he was
"liable to perform military duty" is not sufficient: Bayless v. Estes, 1
Heiskell.
If a soldier could justify under the laws of the Confederate
States to
compel the service of citizens in the armies, the laws and order under
which he acted must be pleaded specially: Id.
CONTRACT.

Illegal-Knowedge not Participation.-Itseems that a statement
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that a note was given for a horse, which the seller knew was to be used
in "the rebel service," without more, does not show a meritorious
defence against the note: Gillam-v. Looney, 1 Heiskell.
CORPORATION.

Amendment of £harter.-A corporator, when sued upon a contract
with the corporation, cannot plead an amendment of the charter without
his consent, in discharge of his liability: Rope Mut. F. Ins. Co. v.
Beekman, 46 or 47 Mo.
COVENANT.

Interference by Equity.-Where a corporation, by its own voluntary
act, has bought lands charged by covenants inseparable from the deed
by which the land was originally conveyed and which were part of the
consideration of the grant; a court of equity cannot strike out a part
of the covenants, because though originally intended to operate for the
equal benefit of both parties, they have become in progress of time
oppressive and burdensome to the grantee; or because the purchase
would make the corporation partners with the grantor in working the
land, whether they would or not, contrary to their duties as a corporation-and the contract would thus become one restraining the alienability of property: Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Amendment of Indictment.-An indictment charging the commission
of a burglary on a day subsequent to the time of finding the indict-

ment, may under our statute be amended on demurrer, or on motion, so
as to state the true date of the commission of the offence, and if the
indictment is not thus amended such defects will be cured by verdict:
State v. Blaisdell, 49 N. H.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Fraud of Debtor-Equity-Laches of Creditor.-Where the pre-

sentation of a claim against an estate settled in the insolvent courts
within the time limited by the statute, has been prevented by the
fraudulent concealment by the deceased, a bill in equity may be maintained to obtain satisfaction out of the surplus in the hands of heirs,
and distributees, if commenced promptly after the discovery of the
claim: Sugar River Bank v. Fairbankset al., 49 N. H.

A delay to commence proceedings for four years after the discovery
of the claim would be altogether too long, and ordinarily the proceedings should be commenced within a few months, in analogy to the time
allowed for the presentation of claims to the commissioners of insolvency: Id.
Conveyance fraudulent as to Creditors- Wife's Alimony-Execu-

tion for.-Where a person conveyed his property to a creditor in satisfaction of his debt, and received back security for the support of himself and wife during life, it appearing that the value of the property
was greater to a substantial amount than the debt, and that the obligation for support was a substantial part of the consideration for the con-
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veyance; it was hld, that such conveyance was fraudulent and void as
to the grantor's creditors: Morrison v. Morrison, 49 N. H.
Where the wife had commenced proceedings for a divorce about the
time of such conveyance, and for causes existing before, and afterwards
obtained a decree of divorce, and for alimony for those causes, and the
conveyance was made to defeat her claim for alimony, it was held that
she stood in relation of a creditor to the grantor and might avoid the
conveyance: Id.
Where there was an ante-nuptial agreement under which mutual
bonds were given, and in the one given by the wife it was stipulated
that it should be void if upon the decease of her husband she should
release her right of allowance and dower, and all other rights she might
be entitled to by law in his estate, it was held, that although there were
terms in the recital in the bond looking to a release by the wife in case
of a dissolution of the marriage otherwise than by .death, yet by a fair
construction of the bond the right to alimony was not cut off: Id.
And also that alimony is to be regarded as an allowance to the wife
for present support, wfiich under the circumstances she could not be
required to take at the husband's house, and therefore it was reasonable'
that he should contribute to her support elsewhere : Id.
Where upon an execution for alimony the body of the husband was
arrested and imprisoned, but released on his giving bond to take the
poor debtor's oath within the year, or surrender himself at the jail at
a levy of the same execution upon the debtor's real estate
the end of it,
within the year, the debtor not having taken the poor debtor's oath, is
void : Id.
DuREss.

Proof to sutport Verdict.-Proof that a payor of a note, with a
friend, met the payee in the road; payor told him they had come to
pay the note; payee went to his son's house and returned, they awaiting
'his return; went to his house; payee said, "You have come to pay
that note;" went into another room to get it; counted interest, and
took pay in Confederate notes, and delivered note; inquired if they
knew.who would borrow the money; put it away in another room, and

coming out, said he would keep an account of the men who paid him
in that kind of money; the payor and friend being unarmed, and using
no threats or force, but being rebels, and the payee being Union, and
being within the Confederate lines, and "there being a general state of
fear in regard to refusing to take Confederate money, many Union men
having been arrested." Held, insufficient to prove duress, or to support
a verdict: Rollings v. Gate, 1 Heiskell.
Charge on foregoing facts that, "if through a present exciting fear,
a person was forced" to take Confederate money, the payment would
not be binding, without anything in charge defining what result feared
.would suffice, is error: Id.
Proof of a generalstate of fear, &c., as above, is inadmissible: Id.
ENTRY.

Burden of Proof-Injunction.-Where a person makes an entry on
land owned by others jointly interested with him in working it, but
which is held by these last subject to a right of entry and possession
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in him, for failure or refusal by them to fulfil certain conditions and
stipulations about the products of the land, which they have covenanted
to fulfil--so that primO faci e his entry is a deforcement of the owners
and an invasion of their ights as such-the burden is on the party
entering to show that his entry was justifiable: Marble Co. v. Ripley,
10 Wall.
Where a deed from one owner conveyed quarry lands to his co-owners,
reserving a right in 'the grantr-if the grantees did not furnish marble
from them-o enter and keep possession and take the marble himself,
till the grantees should be ready and willing to fulfil the conditions of
the contract on their part, an injunction which, after unwarrantable
and illegal entry for alleged condition broken, enjoined the grantor
from hindering the grantees from retaking possession and occupying
and using the premises until the further order of the court, was held
too broad; and 'on appeal was modified so as only to 'enjoin' against an
entry for any cause theretofore existing; thus leaving the grantor to
enjoy his reserved right thereafter untrammelled: Id.
EQUITY. See Covenant; Debtor and Creditor; .Entr.
Specific Performance.-$pecific performance of a contract will not
be decreed.(a) Against one party in favor of another who has disregarded his
own reciprocal obligati6ns in the matter; as ex. gr., against a grantee
of land charged with certain duties in regard to it, in favor of a grantor
who has made a re-entry both unlawful and fraudulent:
(b) Nor where the duties to be fulfilled by the grantee are continuous,
and involve the exercise of skill, personal labor, and cultivated judgment; as ex. gr., to deliver marble 'of certain kinds,'and in blocks of a
kind that the court is incapable of determining whether they accord
not :
with
I '(c)the
Norcontract
where or
there is a want of mutuality in the contract; as ex.
gr., where it is stipulated that one of the parties may abandon the contract at any time on giving a year's notice:
(d) Nor where the party (a grantor) has a complete remedy at law;
as ex. gr., in a grant of quarry land, the grantee agreeing to quarry and
deliver to the grantor certain sorts of marble from it, and the grantor
reserving a right of re-entry in case of non-performance in order to
supply himself; and having moreover a remedy by an ordinary suit at
law on the contract: Marble Co. v. Rip~le, 10 Wall.
njunction-Bond-Measureof Damages.-In a suit in equity against
R., a large stockholder in a corporation, and against the corporatiofi
itself, a temporary injunciion was granted to restrai'n M. from removing
the machinery and other personal property of the corporation out of the
state, and to restrain both defendants from selling the real estate of the
corporation in this state where the business was carried on. And afterwards the injunction was modified so as to allow the machinery and personal property to be removed from the state upon furnishing a siffipient
bond, with condition 'to' ay the plaintiff such sum as'the court upon the
final deuision of the hill in equity might 'award. Upon i final' decree
against R. for the payment of a large sum og money it was he4 that
tle sum to be paid by the obligors in the bond was not necessarily the
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full amount of the decree against R. but the amount of damages occasioned to the plaintiff by such removal of the machinery and other
personal property, and that this amount should be ascertained and fixed
by the decree: Moulton, Adm'r, v. Richardson, 49 N. H.
EVIDENCE.

Opinions of Parties on Political Questions.-It is error to permit a
defendant to prove the "disloyalty" of the plaintiff in a civil action,
for trespass in taking goods: Hart v. Reynolds, 1 Heiskell.
But while in most cases foreign to the issue, it may, in cases of circumstantial evidence, form part of the chain, and become legitimate
proof. As where the question is one affecting the action of persons
during the war, which may be controlled by their relation to the one
party or the other: Ellis v. Spurgin, 1 Heiskell.
Or where the question of duress is involved in a transaction during
the war: Smith v. Cottrell, 1 Heiskell.
Or to show the animus of defendant in making certain declarations:
Smith v. Carr, 1 Heiskell.
If the political status of a party is to be proved, it must be done by
acts and declarations, not by hearsay or reputation: Hart v. Reynolds,
1 Heiskell.
Facts to prove Title by Capture.-Proof that a horse was captured
during thie civil war, by a few Federal soldiers, from two to three persons dressed as rebel soldiers, said to belong to Morgan's command;
turned over to a county provost-marshal; and that afterward, it came
into the defendant's possession, he claiming to have obtained it by
military order, is not sufficient evidence to defeat the right of the
owner, from whom it had been taken by theft or unlawful force: (Jhesney
v.Rodgers, 1 Heiskell.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

In an action of forcible entry and detainer the title as between the
parties is not a matter in issue. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show
that he was in peaceable possession of the premises, and that the
defendant forcibly entered upon and detains the possession of the premises sued for: Van Eaman et al. v. Walker et al., 46 or 47 Mo
GRANT.

Manure- Whether it passes by Conveyance.-By the conveyance of a
house and stable with a small piece of land used as a back-yard but not
cultivated, manure in the stable-cellar, made by the horses of the grantor, who was a teamster, does not pass: Proctorv. Gilson, 49 N. H.
Proof that at the time of the conveyance it was agreed by parol that
-the manure should pass with the land, is not admissible: Id.
Restrictions upon Grantee.-A restriction upon absolute ownership
in a grant of land having on it a quarry, where the grantees agree to
deliver to the grantor, his heirs, &c., so long as they might want a certain number of feet per annum of marble of certain kinds for a partnership purpose (the grantor reserving a right of re-entry and of taking
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the stone himself if the grantees do not fulfil their agreements), is not
to be raised by implication. Hence it is not to be inferred, in the case
of such a grant, where there is no obvious restriction upon the quantity
of stone which the grantees may take out, that the grantees were meant
to be limited to taking out no more stone: Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10
Wall.
Such a grant and reservation as that described supra, limited however in the extent to which the grantees were bound to furnish marble,
does not leave in the grantor a corporeal interest in the marble in situ;
and hence his interest is not exclusive of the right of the grantees to
take marble on their own account ad libitum: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

See Debtor and Creditor.

See Confederate Notes; Evidence.

Capture.-The legality of a capture of private property in time of
war, is not to be presumed, but must be proved: Branner v. Felkner,
1 Heiskell.
A private soldier, without orders, can not make a capture of property
in the hands of a citizen, in time of war: Id.
Evidence that parties, dressed as soldiers, and claiming to be such,
took out of the possession of a citizen, a horse, which had previously
been used in the Confederate service, will not protect from the claim
of the owner, a person afterward found in possession of the horse, claiming to have received him from the soldiers: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Against a Dead Man.-A judgment in favor of or against a dead
man is not a nullity: Carrv. Townsend's Ex'rs, 63 Penna.
In a scire facias on a judgment, the defendant cannot go behind the
original judgment: Id.
A judgment was entered in favor of C., he at the time being dead:
the record imported that he was living, and to allow the contrary to be
shown would have impugned the record: Id.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

JudicialAction.-The granting of an appeal by a justice of the peace
is a judicial act, and he is not liable to an action for erroneously refusing to grant it: Jordan v. Eanson, 49 N. H.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Power to divest Right und'r.-A right to a defence complete under
a statute of limitations, can not be taken away by a statute, ordinance
of a Constitutional Convention, or amendment of the Constitution
Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heiskell.
Deathfrom Wrongful Act or Omission.-A suit to recover, under
section 784 bf the Code, for the death of one, caused by the wrongful
act or omission of another, must be commenced within two years fpom
such death: Tanna v. Jeffersonville Railroad Co., 32 Ind.
This limitation, which is descriptive of the right of action, and to
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which there is no exception, need not be set up in answer; the question
is properly raised by demurrer to the complaint: Id.
Agreement not to take advantage of thze Statute-Bow pleaded in
Equity'-Upon replication filed to a plea that there was no promise
within six years, an agreement not to take advantage of the Statute of
Limitations cannot be given in evidence, it is not within the issue. The
only question is whether there was any promise within six [years:
Cowart v. Perrine,6 C. E. Green.
The old practice would have allowed a rejoinder that the defendants
had agreed not to plead the statute. Now a rejoinder is not allowed,
but the promise should be alleged in the bill, and if omitted by inadvertence, complainant would be allowed to amend:
A promise not to take advantage of the statute made pending a negotiation for allowing further time to arbitrators to report, will not be construed to be an agreement never to take advantage of the statute, but to
be an agreement that the statute should not run while the arbitration
was pending. After that was revoked and at an end the statute would
begin to run : Id.
The ruling in this case, in 3 C. E. Green 454, that a submission to
arbitration does not prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations
is not affected by the fact that pending the submission the right to run
was suspended: Id.
Lis PENDENS.

When it takes Effect-Purchaser of Land during Suit takes subject
to Plaintif'sRights.-Lis pendens only takes effect from the service of
the subpoena. The statute provides that the suit shall not be notice
until the filing of the notice required by the statute, but gives no effect
to the notice. It only restrains its effect: Haughwout v. Xurphy, 6 C.
E. Green.
A person who has contracted for the purchase of land may compel
any one who after such contract and with notice of it, takes the legal
title from the vendor, to perform the contract. The subsequent purchaser to hold the title against such contract of sale, must be a bonafide
purchaser without notice, and must have paid the purchase-money: Id.
If part of the purchase-money remains unpaid after the sale, as to
such part such second purchaser is not protected, but it may be claimed
by the prior purchaser. But in such case the purchaser will bold the
legal title conveyed to him free from any claim under the prior contract,
except as to the purchase-money not paid until after notice of the contract: Id.
That a mortgage was given as security for the payment of the unpaid
purchase-money is not sufficient to protect such subsequent purchaser.
He is only protected as to money actually paid before notice: Id.
A delay of two years and a half not accounted for in bringing suit
to compel specific performance is fatal to relief: Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Civil Indebtedness-Attempt to compel Payment by CriminalAction.
_-W., an attorney, was employed by S. to collect a note; Ire obtained
judgment and issued execution. S. being absent, W. compromised with
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the debtor, and received a less sum than was due on the judgment. W.
retained his fee for services in this case and in others, and deposited the
balance with another attorney to be paid to S., and so informed S. The
other attorney did not pay the balance when demanded. S. had W.
arrested for embezzlement. Held, in an action for malicious prosecution, the judge below could not be required to give his opinion as to
whether W. was civilly liable to S. on account of the compromise:
Schmidt v. Weidman, 63 Penna.
Civil liability of W., if it existed, was not probable cause for instituting criminal proceedings, nor could it bear on the question of malice:
Id.
If one commences a criminal prosecution merely for the purpose of
compelling his debtor to pay a just debt, it is primd facie evidence,
both of want of probable cause and of malice, and shifts the onus on the
defendant: Id.
MORTGAGE.

For FutureAdvances.-An instrument under seal is good, though no
consideration was given for it. Courts will not allow the consideration
to be inquired into for the sake of declaring, the instrument void for
want of consideration, but they will for the purpose of ascertaining
what is due upon it: Farnum v. Burnett, 6 C. R. Green.
A mortgage given by the legal owners of the fee of the mortgaged
premises to one of several persons having a beneficial interest therein,
with the consent of all the others, for the avowed purpose of enabling
him to raise money on it, is a perfectly valid security, and in the hands
of any one who has advanced money or become security for money
raised, is upon a sufficient consideration to sustain it as against all subsequent encumbrancers or purchasers: Id.
A mortgage made for future advances is good as against a subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee: Id.
Entry of Satisfaction.-A mortgagee who has received satisfaction
of the debt upon a suit for redemption, is liable to the penalty imposed
by the statute, if he refuse upon demand to enter satisfaction upon the
margin of the record of the deed: Verges v. Giboney, 46 or 47 Mo.
NEGLIGENCE.

Railroad-Street Crossing-City Ordinance.-IWhere the common
council of a city, having exclusive control of the streets of the city,
specifies by ordinance the general character and extent of work to be
done by railroad companies where the streets are crossed by the tracks
of their roads, in order that such railroad tracks may be crossed with
more safety and convenience by the public, such work and the repairs
thereof to be done and maintained to the satisfaction of a specified
agent of the city, without, however, furnishing detailed specifications
as to the particular manner in which the work shall be executed or
requiring it to be done under the supervision, control, and direction of
an authorized agent of the city; the fact that such work is done and
maintained by a railroad company to the satisfaction of such specified
agent, does not relieve the company from liability for an injury to a
horse driven without fault or negligence over such crossing, such injury
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being occasioned by the work having been done or maintained in an
unskilfal and improper manner, rendering the crossing unsafe and dangerous: .Dezell v. Ind. and Cin. Railroad Co., 82 Ind.
The council of Indianapolis by ordinance imade it the duty of any
railroad company whose track might cross or intersect any street of said
city, to make the grade of the track conform to the established grade
of the street, and to pave the street with boulder stones, or to lay down
'planks between the rails and for two feet on either side of such track,
in such manner that the planks or boulder stones should extend the
entire width of such street, or as far as such track might extend, such
bouldering or planking or repairs thereof to be done and maintained to
the satisfaction of the civil engineer of the city; the object of the
requirement, as declared by the ordinance, being, "1that such railroad
track may be crossed with more safety and convenience by the public."
Suit for damages against a railroad company, whose track extended
across a public street, by the owner of a horse injured while being
driven without fault or negligence across said railroad on said street,
such injury being occasioned by the unskilful and improper manner of
constructing and maintaining the crossing. Answer, that the defendant
had complied with said ordinance, by laying down securely at said crossing strong and substantial planks between the rails and for two feet on
either side of the track, extending the entire width of the crossing,
doing said planking and maintaining it in repair to the satisfaction of
the civil engineer of said city. Held, that the answer was bad on
demurrer: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Injunction against Partner at suit of the other.-Equity will enjoin
one partner from violating the rights of his copartner in partnership
matters, although no dissolution of the partnership be contemplated:
Marble Company v. Ripley, 10 Wall.
Admissions.-In an action on account for goods sold by the plaintiff
to the defendants, A. and B., where the question at issue before the
jury was, whether A. and B. were partners at the date of such sale:
Held, that the declaration of A. made to persons not parties, some
months previous to the alleged sale, to the effect that such a partnership
existed then, concealed from the public, in the business for the continuance of which the purchase in question was made, were admissible.
Held, also, that evidence showing that, about the date of the sale in
question, other persons than the plaintiff dealt with A. and B. as partners in such business, and showing the accompanying acts and declarations of A. to the effect that there was then such a partnership, was
admissible: Bennett v. Holmes, 32 Ind.
PLEADING.
Aron-joinder of Parties.-In actions ex delicto the non-joinder of a
party who ought, to have been made plaintiff, can be taken advantage
of only by plea in abatement, or by way of apportionment of damages:
Cooper v. Grand Trunk Railway, 49 N. H.
REBELLION.

See Confederate States.
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REPLEvIN.

erdict.-In an action of replevin, the property involved in the suit
was specifically described in the complaint, and was referred to in the
verdict as "said property." Held, that a more specific description of
the property in the verdict was unnecessary: Anderson v. Lane, 32 Ind.
SALE.

What is.-In an action for the price of a boat laden with coal, it
appeared that there had been no actual delivery or possession taken by
the alleged vendee and there was no specification of price. Eeld, that
there was no sale: Big y v. Risher, 63 Penna.
Sale means a'contract to pass rights of property for money, which the
buyer pays or promises to pay to the seller for' the thing bought: Id.
SEALED INSTRUMIENT.

See ffortgage

Validity,-Inquiry into consideration- Undue Ifluence.-To a bill

for injunction to restrain proceedings at law upon a note and sealed bill
alleged to have been given when the maker ias incomnpetent, and also
through undue influence, and also alleging that there was a pretended
consideration of 'the conveyance or release of some lands, and asking a
discovery of the'consideration, and of the' value thereof. "Defendants
answer that the consideration 'ofthe note iWas thereleas'e of their intr~st
in some lands, but decline to state the value of the 'lands, :on the ground
that the release of the lands, and not the'valu. was the considerati6n,
and as to the bill, that, itbeing under seal needs no consideration.
Motion iodissolve denied. D-efehdants must answer fully as toihe value
of the lands:
iortwell's Administrtr v. Struble and Wfe, 16 0. .

13reen.

The complainant is entitled to a discovery of the consideration of the
sealed bill, not n't6 g bhd'that it would be void wfthout' consideration, but on the ground that the want of consideration, together'with the
imbecility of the testatr and 'some undue'influence 'used by'the'defendant in securing its execution, might at law render the bill invalid, when
the same imbecility or influen'c would not affect its validity'ifgivenfor
a plain and acknowleaged 'debt jistly due from the intestate: Id.
If the sealed bill was' obtained legally and without fraud, though
without consideration, the defendants will be entitled to recover upon
it, but; in such case it was an advancement by the intestate, 'and must
be brought into hotchpot before'distribution of the personal estate and
the consideration must be disclos~d : Id
STAMPS.

Fraudulent Onisson.-Under the Act of July 13th 1866, 14 Stat.
at Large 142, which requiies promissory notes to be stamped, making
them void only when the stamd isomitted with intent' to defraud the
government of the stamp 'duty, such fraudulent omission cannot be
taken advantage of on demurrer: Campbels v. Wilcox, 10 Wall.
An averment in a deelaration that the defendants had made"an delive'red to the plaint'is their promisory note, implies that the' instrnments were at 'the time in the form and condition repuired. by law: Id.
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Deed valid without.-United States revenue stamps are not essential
to the validity of a deed, nor to its admissibility as evidence in a state
court: Sporrer v. ifter, 1 Heiskell.
Instruments made within Confederate lines.-An instrument made
within the Confederate lines is not void for want of a stamp : Susong v.
Wzliams, 1 Heiskell.
TAX SALES.

Redemption of Lands-Act of Congress of 1862-Insurrectionary
Districts.-Statutesauthorizing redemption from sales for taxes, are to
be construed favorably to the owners of the land, and particularly when
they provide full indemnity to the purchaser and impose a penalty on
the delinquent: Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall.
A person who has. been appointed by an order of court, trustee of a
testator's lands generally, the testator having died seised of some lands
in the state or district,. over which the court had jurisdiction, and some
in an adjoining state not far from the appointee's residence, but over
which it had no jurisdiction, and who pays the redemption-money on
lands in the latter state, sold under the Act of June 7th 1862, for the
collection of taxes in insurrectionary districts, and with the assistance
of the cestui gue trusts of the land sold (married women) who make affidavits in the case, obtains a certificate of redemption, may properly,
where the trustee named in the will has declined to act, be regarded as
a person "having charge" of the estate of the owners, within the meaning of the act, which authorizes such persons to redeem: Id.
A person so "having charge," is not obliged to take the oath
required by the 7th section of the Act of March 3d 1865, amendatory
of the Act just named "that he has not taken part with the insurgents
in the present rebellion," &c. : Id.
Nor obliged, in order to recover, to show that the certificate of
redemption was forwarded to the secretary of the treasury, and the defendant repaid his purchase-money by a draft drawn on the treasury of
the United States: Id.
The voluntary residence of a person within the Confederate lines
during the late rebellion, did not incapacitate him, under the Act of
July 17th 1862,. "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels and for other purposes"-aud which makes null and void all sales, transfers, and conveyances, of any estate and property, of persons engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, or aiding and abetting such rebellion,
who after sixty days' warning and proclamation duly given and made by
the President, did not cease to aid, countenance and abet such rebellion
and return to his allegiance to the United States, and which Act prescribes proceedings to condemn such property, and apply the proceeds
to the support of the army-from making a last will and testament, further, if at all, than as against the United States: 1d.
Assuming (what is not decided) that a devise is within the terms
"sales, transfers, and conveyances," invalidated by the act, and that a
person who during the rebellion left loyal territory and went to and
resided in and died in the rebel lines, is within the category of persons
for whom the warning and proclamation of the President prescribed by
the act was intended, the invalidity declared is to be regarded as lir-
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ited and not absolute; and it is only as against the United States that
the "sales, transfers, and conveyances," of property liable to seizure,
are null and void. They are not void as between private persons, or
against any other party than the United States: Id.
UNITED STATES.

Title to Property.-The title of the government of the United States
to personal property, is subject to be contested by a citizen who has a
claim to the property: Dawson v. Susong, 1 Heiskell.
United States brand on stock, and a sale of it at a public sale, will not
preclude the true owner of the stock from the recovery of it. Government brands on stock are evidence that the United States has had the
property in possession as a claimant, but do not prove a title: Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

Navigable River-Rparia Owner.-The owner of land bounded by
a navigable river has certain riparian rights, whether his title extend to
the middle of the stream or not, and among these, are free access to the
navigable part of the stream, and the right to make a landing, wharf,
or pier for his own use, or for the use of the public: Yates v. MTilwaukee, 10 Wall.
These rights are valuable and are property, and can be taken for the
public good only when due compensation is made: -d.
They are to be enjoyed subject to such general rules and laws as the
legislature may prescribe for the protection of the public right in the
river as a navigable stream: Id.
But a statute of a state which confers on a city, the power to establish dock and wharf lines, and to restrain encroachments and prevent
obstructions to such a stream, does not authorize it to declare by special
ordinance a private wharf to be an obstruction to navigation and a nuisance, and to order its removal, when, in point of fact, it was no obstruction, or hindrance to navigation : Id.
The question of nuisance or obstruction must be determined by general and fixed laws, and it is not to be tolerated that the local municipal
authorities of a city declare any particular business or structure a nuisance in such a summary mode, and enforce its decision at its own
pleasure : Id.
WILLS.
Rule in Shelley's Case.-The rule in Shelley's Case must govern in
the construction of wills made prior to June 13th 1820, in all cases
where it is applicable : Quick's Executor v. Quick, 6 0. E. Green.
The rule applies even when another estate for life is interposed between the death of the first tenant for life, and the estate to his heirs:
Id.
A devise upon the decease of a tenant for life to heirs "as the law
directs" in case of dying intestate, means as the law was at the time of
making the will, and not as it might be at the death of the tefiant for
life: Id.
Such limitation as it gives the estate at the death of the life tenant
to person who may not then be his heirs at law, or in shares different
from those prescribed by the law at that time, prevents the application

